Failures of the mid-east peace treaties

To contact us Click HERE
The force departure of Hosni Mubarakin Egypt has galvanized other countries throughout the Middle East and NorthAfrica to start their own protests. The state of euphoria that swept throughoutEgyptafter the former ruler’s collapse was so strong that it left the internationalcommunity mesmerized. Still, the outcome of these protests cannot be easilypredicted. One reoccurring theme is the impact that these events will have on Israel.
During these tumultuous times Israel’speace treaty with both Egypt and Jordan will be put to the test. Originally,the peace treaties between Israeland Jordan and Egypt signaledan end to hostility between these countries. However, with the fall of one of Israel’s few allies in the region coupled withgrowing protest in Jordan, Israelis ambivalent about its future. In spite of the peace treaties original intent,hostilities still continue to grow among all three countries.
The main reason why animosity stillcontinues to grow is because the economic and political conditions of theJordanians, Egyptians, and Palestinians have not improved but have become worsesince the implementation of the peace treaties.
BRIEF HISTORY
Since the beginning of Israel’sbirth in 1948 the country has been in conflict with it’s Arab neighbors ( Syria, Egypt , Transjordan etc.). The first round of fighting ensued for a few monthsin 1948.^[1] Thisfighting led to the dispersal of Palestinians to Gaza, West Bank, and Jordan.Conflict between Israel andits neighbors erupted again in 1956 when the socialist leader, Gamal AbdelNasser sent peasant guerilla groups known as the fedayeen to fight againstIsraeli settlers in Gaza.
 In an effort to rid Egypt of any colonialremnants the Egyptian leader began a project of nationalization of the SuezCanal, an expedient transportation trading route connecting Europe to Asia.(TIME 2006)  Consequently, Both Britainand France used their military might to protect their colonial interest.However the fighting ended when the emerging superpower of the time, the U.S. intervenedand called for all parts to enforce a cease fire.
The next major conflict that furthernecessitated the role of peace for Israel and its neighbors was the Six Day Warin 1967(TIME 2006).  Israel launchedthe first attack. From the Israeli perspective they attacked first as apreventive measure. From the Arab perspective Israel was engaging in territorialexpansionism.
 The tension between Israeli and its Arabstates varied. Egypt, stillupset at its defeat from Israel10 years prior, felt it had the capacity to destroy Israel once and for all. While Egypt’s contentions with Israel were based on ideology, Syria’s was amatter of resources. In contrast, Syria’sattacks were in response to Israeli’s National Water Carrier project whichdiverted water from Jordanfor Israeli agricultural needs. Soon an indecisive Jordan,as well as Iraq and Lebanon came tothe side of its Arab brethren in fighting against the Jewish state. Jewishvictory led to the territorial expansion of Israelinto the Syrian Golan Heights, Egypt’sSinai Peninsula, and Jordan’sWest Bank and East Jerusalem. (TIME 2006)
 THE EGYPTIAN JEW
 The tension between Egypt and Israel not onlycreated a refugee crisis for Palestinian refugees who lived in the area, butalso contributed to the mass departure of Jews from Egypt. Fromapproximately a hundred thousand Jews in Egypt prior to the establishment ofthe Jewish state in 1948 to a few hundred in 1979 when the peace treaty wassign^[2].Prior to this time there had been tension between Jews and Muslims. Duringcolonial control of Egyptmany Egyptians were passed over for jobs that went to foreigners until 1947when laws were passed to ensure Egyptian employment. One of the consequences ofthis policy was that it limited the social interaction of Jews and Egyptians (PERETZ1994).
 Recently, job openings for Egyptians in Israeldue to labor shortages have provided new opportunities for Egyptians andIsraelis to interact. This migration is even creating small pockets of Egyptianculture throughout Israel.According to Shukri Al-Shazli, head of the NeighborsAssociation, an Egyptian association based in Israel, there are 6,000-7,000Egyptians living in Israel legally while an additional 5,000-6,000 settledillegally.^[3]


However, despite this seemingly goodnews, the increased interaction due to immigration among Egyptians and Israelishas caused some backlash. According to a report from Al Jazeera^[4](2010), some politicians in Egyptwant to revoke citizenship of Egyptians married to Israelis. For thesepoliticians, Egyptians who are going back and forth between Israel and Egypt could potentially be spies. Israel has alsotaken steps to limit social mobility. For Israeli officials, the concern isdemographics, as more non-Jews settle in Israel the Jewish identity which isat the heart of the Jewish state is in danger. (Saad 2005) It is important topoint out that while Egyptian officials view the migration of Egyptians backand forth between Israel andEgyptas a security threat, they conveniently forget the economic benefits. Accordingto a study by the World Bank, Israeli is one of the top ten sources ofremittance for Egyptbringing in an estimated $48 million in 2006. Although one of the provisions inthe peace treaty allows for the freedom of movement there are stillrestrictions. One prime example is marriage.  According to a news reportfrom Al Jazeera, there is a controversy stirring in Egyptian courts to denycitizenship to men who are married to Israeli women.  Supporters of thelegislation claim that intermarriage undermines Egyptian sovereignty and posesa threat to Egyptians security.   This clearly shows that the diplomaticrelationship between these two countries as outlined in the Camp David accords has not promoted peace but instead it has promotedan atmosphere of suspicion.



THE GREAT EGYPT
While the various battles foughtwith Egypt was one reason to enter a peace treaty with its western neighboranother reason was because of the influence Egypt had in the region. Anillustrative example took place when then Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasserattempted to unify Syria andEgyptas one state (PERETZ 1994). To the chagrin of Nasser and his followers, theproject known as the United Arab Republic failed to gain traction in Syria. Afterthree years the project fell apart and Syria backed out. In addition,Egyptian media outlets such as Radio Cairo were widely popular throughout thecapitals of Arab countries, which further contributed to Egypt’sinfluence in the region. Moreover, Cairowas the capital where Arab officials would congregate to discuss different issuesfacing the region (PERETZ 1994). Essentially, the logic behind the peace treatywas not just to strengthen the bilateral relationship between Israel and Egypt but it was also meant toprovide a model for other Arab countries to follow.  Even today Egyptis looked upon by it citizens as a leader in the developing world.^[5]


These events became the impetus forthe peace process between Egypt and Israel and later Israel and Jordan. Theintentions of the byzantine treaties signed between Egyptand Israel, and laterbetween Jordan, was morethan a gesture to end violence between Israel and its two borderingstates. The peace treaty with Egyptincluded UN resolution 242, which states under its preamble that the desire forpeace extends to the area in general. The Camp David Accords included economic,culture and migration issues under its mantle. The Jordanian peace agreementincluded these issues under its framework but also contained topics such as theallocation of natural resources primarily water, and a clause that stipulatedthat the Palestinian issue would be the joint responsibility of all threecountries. Moreover, the Egyptian treaty included the return of Sinai Peninsula,and the freedom for Israel touse the Suez Canal for trade. The Jordanian bilateralpeace treaty consisted of detailed stipulations for the use of the Jordan River.  In addition, all three countries weregiven a substantial amount of aid, both military and civilian, from the United States.


PEOPLE'S RESPONSE
Overall, public opinion of the peacetreaties has been mixed.  During its infancy the potential peace between Israel and Egypt has garnered wide supportamongst Egyptians.^[6]However, recent research conducted after the fall of Mubarak’s regime suggeststhat support for the peace treaty has dwindled considerably (Haaretz). Thiscomes as no surprise for Daniel Pipes who began to recognize this trend.According to Pipes, (2006) even secular Egyptian organization like Kifayacirculated a petition calling for Egyptto divorce itself from Israel. 


 According to a recent polltaken in Egypt between March 24^th and April 7^th  only 36 percent of Egyptians look favorablytowards the treaty.^[7] The demographic variations that exist in the polling arenoteworthy.  Wealthier Egyptians were more open to sustaining peacebetween Israel.Likewise, Egyptians with more education were also receptive. In addition, EhudYaari, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted thatwhile most of the anger during the recent protests was aimed towards the formerEgyptian government, some smaller protest depicted Mubarak as puppet of Israel.Ironically, while some segments of the population were denouncing Israel, others left Egyptand fled to Israelto escape the brutal crackdown during the protests.  In Jordan theharmful effects of the peace treaty has produced negative attitudes towardsJews. In general, Israel’sattempts at diplomacy with Jordan,Egypt, Lebanon and thePalestinian territories have been negatively received by their respected Arabicpublics. ^[8]
Since its implementation, there havebeen objections to the treaty. Some object to the treaty on religious grounds.Others reject engaging with Israelbecause of nationalism. Shortly after the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt’s pro-capitalist leader,Anwar Sadat, was assassinated. In the following decades, Jewish extremistswould also respond with violence by killing Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabinfor making concession to Palestinians during the Oslo Accords. These eventsshow that there is strong opposition to peace (TIME 2006).           

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

One group in particular that hasacted as an obstacle to peace is the Muslim Brotherhood. While the MuslimBrotherhood operated in both the West Bank and Gazait was the latter rather than the former that posed a potential security threatto Israel. While the Muslim Brotherhood under Jordanian rule had more political capital inthe West Bank than in Egypt,Jordanian members focused on spreading Islam rather than attacking Israel. TheMuslim Brotherhood near Gazahad a different goal. The Muslim Brotherhood near Gazamixed nationalism with religion in an effort to create a formidable enemyagainst Israel.^[9]
Recently, there have been signs thatthe Muslim Brotherhood has been willing to compromise. According to Shadi Hamid(2011), Director of Research at the BrookingsDoha Center,both the Jordanian and Egyptian Brotherhood publicly stated they would respectthe peace treaties with Israel.This political calculus is radically different then their Libyan counterpartswho refuse to acknowledge the state of Israel’s right to exist. TheIslamists in both Jordan andEgyptare becoming increasingly more pragmatic because they realize the positiveimpact western assistance has on their countries economy as a condition forpeace.^[10]  Still, despite these concessions, the Muslim Brotherhood’s litmus testfor political office (no Christians no women) will alienate a large segment ofEgyptian society.^[11] Itis important to note that not all the resistance comes from radical Muslims butaccording to one study, Jews with high levels of religiosity were morereluctant to engage in the peace process. ^[12] 


There are a variety of reasons thatcaused the shift in attitude towards the peace process. Domestic opposition tothe peace treaty from the Arab countries includes issues such as the invasionof Lebanonin the early 80’s, the deportation of Hamas activists in the early 90’s and thebombing of the Iraqi nuclear facilities in 1981. (Kenneth Stein). Theseactivities led Egyptians to believe that Israel was not committed to thepeace process. Notwithstanding these issues, Israel has reduced its militaryexpenditure from 23 percent during the peace treaty’s infancy to 9 percenttoday. Actions by Egyptians have also made Israelis skeptical about Egypt’s trueintentions. For example, Yuval Steinitz
estimated that 90 percent of PLO andHamas explosives come from Egypt.There are even claims that Hamas is launching attacks against Israel from SinaiPeninsula.^[13] This brings up an important point. On the surface, it may appear as though theincrease in military spending is being used, intentionally or not, to launchcovert attacks against Israelvia Hamas and other militant Islamic groups. The truth is that the military ismore than a coercive instrument of foreign policy. The military industrialcomplex in Egyptis deeply entrenched in the economy.^[14] Inaddition to providing jobs and social services for young people the militaryalso produces consumer products, food, and sponsors sporting events.Furthermore, while the defense spending of Egyptmay be higher than Israel’sit is important to note that Egyptis the most populated country in the region. The population of Egypt is more than twelve times Israel.^[15]


MONEY TALKS
One of the main initiatives of thepeace treaties was to use economics as a means to lessen tension. There arevast economic differences between the three countries. Unlike Egypt, a country with a large population and alow per capita GDP and a high rate of rural poverty, both Israel and Jordan have higher rates of foreigndirect Investment and export agricultural goods.^[16] Jordanuses 10 percent of its land to provide 75 percent of its crops.^[17] Incontrast, the rise in Egypt’spopulation has made it a major importer of basic food staples like wheat.Consequently, the Egyptian government uses most of the revenue from the Suez Canal and tourism to maintain food subsidies. (Karan2004). In addition, while Israeland Jordanhave attracted numerous tourist, Egyptian tourism has lost close to $2 billionannually because of terrorism.. Terrorism is not the only threat to tourism,which is one of Egypt’smain sources of income. Another threat is religion. A prominent Islamic leaderhas issued a fatwa that prohibited statues. Egyptian statues are one of themain attractions that bring in tourists ever year. ^[18] Also, itshould be noted that while tourism for Israelis to Jordan has increased, the number of Egyptianstraveling to Israelhas decreased (MIRTHA 2008).


Under article two of the CampDavid Accords both countries were to undergo policies that would encouragefurther economic integration, which will lead to economic growth by increasingtrade and discouraging policies that are protectionist in nature. To thechagrin of optimists, the implementation of the peace treaty is not benefitingthe Egyptian public. For example, charges of corruption have become an obstaclefor increasing gas exports to Egypt.This is important given the fact that Egyptsupplies 40 percent of Israel’sNatural Gas. (INTERNATINAL DEBATES 2011) In addition, there is some evidence tosuggest that economic aid is used to secure political patronage rather thanhelp those unemployed. A concrete example of this is Egypt’s aforementioned militaryindustrial complex. Corruption, coupled with growing distrust between Israel and Egypt’s public has created anatmosphere of instability which has led to less economic integration.


The problem in Egypt specifically isthat the peace treaty created a new form of political patronage system betweenthe business elite and the Mubarak regime. For example, while Mubarak andhis family have amassed a large fortune, economic opportunities for the youthhave diminished. The rate of collegiate matriculation has quadrupled recently,whereas the supply of jobs has remained steady. Moreover, budget cuts, whichincluded programs for college graduates to find jobs, further frustratedcollege students. In this context, the likelihood of an Egyptian with anelementary education having a job was much higher than a college graduate.^[19] In addition, social programs that focus on job placement for college graduatehave been cut from the budget making it much more difficulty for collegegraduates to find work which further limited economic prospects.


While Jordan and Egypt have beenapplauded for improving macro-economic indicators such as GDP the generalsociety has not benefited. The wave of privatization that swept throughout Egypt inparticular benefited a select few. The economic reforms that accompanied thesegrowing trends did nothing to help the people. Governmental agencies thatencouraged competition and tried to prevent monopolies from forming were nottaken seriously by the business elite. The lack of participation in the economyis clearly visible in Egyptwhen businesses and exporters were encouraged to submit proposals to theMinistry of Foreign Trade only to find out later their ideas were rejected. Inaddition, those whose voices are heard tend to be from big companies who arenot interested in the opinion of smaller businesses. Another example is theEgyptian Business Association which has been criticized for its high standardswhich limits input from businesses that are not a part of the politicalpatronage system.


Likewise, there are signs that theeconomic relationship with Jordan is beginning to decline.^[20]  Oneconcrete example of this problem is the objections from the professionalassociations. These organizations wield considerable influence in terms ofemployment. In Jordan,it is required for anyone who is in a profession to register with aprofessional association. Professional associations can revoke membership if anindividual appears to be sympathetic to the peace process. Although any dismissalcan be challenged by the Higher Courts of Justice, the reputation of the personwho was dismissed is tarnished in the business community.


Supporters of the peace treaty inJordan often shop at local markets that supply Israeli fruits and vegetables.Merchants who are wary of the stigma attached to Israeli imports will removethe tag that states the product was made in Israel. It is also interesting tonote that although many Arab countries boycott Israeli products, some Israelicompanies use Jordanas a means to gain access to a larger Arab market. One concern many Jordaniansbusinesses have is transportation inefficiency. When a Jordanian truck stops atthe border of Israel and Jordan, goods get transferred from the Jordaniantruck to the Israeltruck as a security measure. Jordanians complain that this system restricts themobility of goods which drives up cost. Another issue is regulation. UnderIsraeli law, any Jordanian good needs to be tested in Israel then ina Jordanian lab before it is acceptable for consumption. Israel arguesthat it does not accredit laboratories because of the anti-Israeli policies ofthe professional associations (MIRTHA 2010).


In addition, Jordanians object toIsrael use of quotas, VAT and custom tariffs when trading with each other.Jordanians also feel that it is harder to compete with Israelcompanies because of the quality of the product is of a higher standard at thesame price. Israelcounters Jordanian objections by stating that some Israeli companies haveclosed domestic production and have moved instead to Jordanian as a sign ofpeace.


One attempt to integrate the regionand grow the economy came from Europe in 1995 when it began theEuro-Mediterranean Partnership. The bilateral trade agreement between the ArabMediterranean and Europe rewards Arabcountries by providing aid, investment, access to European markets and loans.Since the project began Europe has given 5billion dollars to help. In the near future the U.S.wants to begin a regional trading block in the Middle East (Balaamand Veseth 2008).


Another attempt to sustain peacethrough economic means was through the qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ)program. It was a program established under the Israeli-U.S. Free TradeAgreement (FTA). The specific goal of the program was to promote economiccooperation through foreign direct investment. Jordanwould contribute its labor force and Israelwould contribute by way of high technology to produce goods and export them to America (MIRTHA2010).


One issue particular to Jordan iswater usage. Article three of the peace treaty posits several stipulationssuch as joint protection of the Jordan Riverfrom pollution, and fair use of the Yarmouk Rivers. Under Article Four of thepeace treaty, Jordan isobligated to fix any well in need of repair while Israelsupplies Jordanwith technical information. Although there are some objections on how water ismanaged between the two countries,  Jordanians feel that Israel has beenmore cooperative than Syria, a country that has been reluctant to help Jordanwhen it had water shortages. (MIRTHA 2010)


Although economic integration, asarticulated in the peace treaties posed their own unique problems, anothermajor point of contention are the political consequences in Egypt and Jordanafter the treaties were signed.  SomeEgyptians feel as though the former regime uses the peace treaty as a vehicleto launch an attack on all forms of dissidence through arbitrary arrest anddetention. In other words, some view the peace treaty as a symbol of politicalrepression. Although much of the foreign aid Egypt receives was crucial toimproving its infrastructure, roads, water purification plants, it was not accompaniedby democratic reform (KARAN 2004). The economic incentives for peacesimultaneously produced a series of economic reforms and political amendmentsthat restricted freedom.^[21] Aprime example is Article 179 that allows the president to imprison suspectedterrorist without any recourse for an appeal. It is not just suspectedterrorists who are affected but even peaceful dissidents are often targeted bythe regime. One tactic that the Mubarak regime has used to control theinfluence of the Muslim brotherhood is to arrest some of its prominent members.Once arrested, these leaders are arrested and imprisoned they legally preventedfrom running for office (INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 2011) “In short, the coupling ofeconomic and political reforms meant that economic liberalization wasinstitutionalized at the same time that political rights were constrained.” (Saif & Choucair page 130).



POLITICAL CHAOS
Ironically, some have fled to Israelto escape the political instability in Egypt even though some have linked thepolitical problems to Egypt with the peace treaty.^[22]  Inone extreme case, an Egyptian citizen fled to Israel after he was tortured, putinto jail for ten years without access to a lawyer. Under the Mubarak regimeonly those who are rich or are socially connected to the security forces areafforded social justice.  (Cohen Nir)


Jordanians have also encounteredpolitical problems in the aftermath of the peace treaty as well. As aconsequent of the peace treaty the King grew increasingly autocratic and putrestrictions on Islamists entering the political arena. Prior to the peace treatythe distribution of power between Parliament and the government was even.However, a few years after the peace treaty was signed political participationbecame a luxury for a select few.


While the political environment inboth Jordan and Egypt provide fertile ground for hostility against anythingenabling their regimes (i.e. the peace treaties), another reason for the shiftin attitude comes from both the media and statements issued by governmentalofficials. For example, following the 1987, intifada the Egyptian mediaportrayed Israelas genocidal and oppressive. In one instance, the Egyptian media has accused Israel ofspreading AIDS and using educational institutions as spying outposts. TheEgyptian media’s relationship with Israelwas further strained when Al-Ahram banned interaction between Egyptianjournalists and Israelis in response to the Israeli attack on Gaza. (internet link). Statements from right-wingIsraeli politicians, like Avigdor Lieberman, have created an environment of mistrustbetween countries. Lieberman has said that if war were to break out between Egypt and Israelthat Israelwould be justified in bombing the Aswan Dam.^[23]  The presence of Right wing Israeli officialsand anti-Israeli Arabs is creating an environment of distrust that is toxic tothe peace process.



PALESTINE
The last concern is the Palestinianrefugees. The Palestinian territory is defined as the Gaza Strip on the westand the West bank on the East. In short, the Palestinians are restricted fromimmigrating to Israel, astate that wants to maintain its Jewish identity, and to Egypt, acountry that is aware of its burgeoning population. For Jordan, it isalso an issue of identity. Currently, 35 percent of the population in Jordan isPalestinian (MIRTHA 2010). One issue particularly to Palestinians that has beena thorn to the peace process is the use of the military court system to controlthe Israelpopulation (VESSETH & BAALAM 2008). In addition, the lack of economicactivity due to restrictions on labor movement coupled with low levels ofinternational integration in the world economy has devastated Gaza’s economy.


It is important to understand thatalthough Israel deserves much criticism when it comes to the Palestinian issueboth Egypt and Jordan are not exonerated from blame either. According to SaraRoy, Omar Soliman, a high ranking Egyptian official, said that he does not wantthe people from Gazato starve but to ‘go hungry.^[24]’This information is truly revealing given the fact that food insecurityincreasedfrom 40 percent in 2003 to 61 percent by the end of 2010.  In other words,approximately 900,000 Palestinians out of 1.5 million are malnourished.Likewise, Jordan’srelationship with the Palestinians has not always been amicable either. Jordaniantension with Palestinians dates back to the September attacks when Palestinianswaged war against Hashemite kingdom (TIME 2006). In addition, it is harder forPalestinians living in both Jordanand Israelto compete with lower paid Asian workers (VESSETH & BAALAM 2008). Thefreedom of movement clause within the Egyptian treaty as well as portions ofthe Jordanian treaty shows that Palestinian rights are important for peace. IfPalestinian self-determination is a strong indicator of the success of thesetreaties then what the evidence shows is that the treaties are failing.


Theresistance to cooperate between Israelis, Egyptians, Jordanians, andPalestinians has proven to be disastrous. While there have been cosmeticreforms in the name of peace there is still much to be done.  Fulleconomic integration would increase Israeli household income by $4,429, Egypt’s “peacedividend” (a measure that calculates the economic benefits of integration) wouldbegin at $1.8 billion in 2011 and rise to $17.3 billion by 2015. Even Saudi Arabiawould benefit economically from $3.6 billion in 2011 to $52.5 billion by 2015(MIRTHA 2010). From the standpoint of realism the fact that none of thecountries that signed the peace treaties with Israelhave gone to war with Israelindicate the peace treaty was a success. Notwithstanding realism’s myopicperspective on this issue, the theory of complex interdependence demonstratesthe failures of these formal agreements. Despite the consequences of the peacetreaty both Jordanians and Egyptians should try to further cement theirrelationship with Israel.One specific reason why this relationship is beneficial for Jordan and Egypt isbecause it will give the two countries access to Israel professionals who havehigh level of education capital (scientist, engineers etc) (VASSETH &BAALAM).  In order for the trilateralpeace agreements between the countries to become a beacon of stability andprosperity in the region, there needs to be more of an emphasis on publicparticipation rather than state interests. Consequently, this paradigm shift will transform the region from a toxicatmosphere of mistrust and animosity to an economically vibrant region based onmutual cooperation and understanding.


WORK CITED

1. Associated Press (2007) Poll:More than half of Egyptians want to cancel peace treaty. Haaaretz

2. Balaam, D.N., Vesseth. M (2008). Introduction to International Political Economy, Pearson, Jersey.
3. Byman. D (2011) Terrorism After the Revolution. Foreign Affairs Vol.90 No.3 pg. 48-54

4. Cohen, S.P. (1981) From War to Peace; The Transition between Egypt and Israel , Journal of Conflict Resolution
5. The Economists (2009) A Chillier Peace: Thirty years after the peace treaty, Egypt and Israel are only friends

6. The Future of Egypt; Panel Discussion (2006) The Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 10, No.3 Article 3

7. Goldstone, J.A. (2011) Understanding the Revolution of 2011 Foreign Affairs Vol. 90. No.3 pg.8-16

8. Hamid, S (2011) The Rise of the Islamists. Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No.3 pg. 40-47

9. U.S.-Egyptian Relations(2011) International Debates Vol. 9 Issue 3 p14-23

10. Inside Story; Egypt-Israeli Relations (2010) Al-Jazeera Accessed via YouTube

11. Karan, P.P. (2004) The Non-Western World. New York , Routledge.
12. Khoury, J (2009) Egypt Media group agrees on massive Israel boycott. Haaretz

13. Time (2006) The Middle East; The history, The Culture the conflicts The Faiths
14. Mirtha. F (2010). “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship; The Reality of “Cooperation.” Middle East Policy, Vol XXII No.2

15. Peretz, D (1994). The Middle East Today Praeger, Westport

16. Pipes D (2006) Time to Recognize Failure of Israel-Egypt Treaty New York Sun

17. Roy S (2011). Gaza after the Revolution. Foreign Policy

18. Saad. R (2005) An Unlikely Homeland Al-Ahram issue # 758

19. Saif, I & Choucair, F (2010) Status Quo Camouflaged: Economic and Social Transformation. Middle East Law and Governance pg,124-151

20. Smith L (2011) The Future of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The Weekly Standard

21. Stein K.W. (1997) Egyptian-Israeli Relations. Global Research in International Affairs Vol.1 no.3

22. Tibon,S, Blumberg, H.H. (1999) Authoritarianism and Political Socialization in the Context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Political Psychology, Vol 20, No. 3

23. Vatikiotis, P.J. (1992). The History of Modern Egypt (4th edition ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.

24. Wikitorowicz (2004) Islamic Activism; A Social Movement Theory Approach Bloomington, Indiana University Press pp 120-121. 72-77

25. WORLD BANK (2011) Military Expenditures as GDP Percentage

26. WORLD BANK (2011) Net Migration

27. Yaari E(2011) The Arab Revolutions: An Israeli Perspective. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

---

[1] Time (2006) The Middle East; The history, The Culture the conflicts The Faiths
[2]Peretz, D (1994). The Middle East TodayPraeger, Westport
[3]Saad. R (2005) An Unlikely Homeland Al-Ahramissue # 758
[4]Inside Story; Egypt-Israeli Relations (2010) Al-Jazeera Accessed via YouTube

[5]The Future of Egypt; PanelDiscussion (2006) The Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs Vol. 10, No.3 Article 3
[6] Vatikiotis, P.J. (1992). The History of Modern Egypt (4th edition ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University[7]Associated Press (2007) Poll:More thanhalf of Egyptians want to cancel peace treaty. Haaaretz
[8]Pipes D (2006) Time to Recognize Failure of Israel-Egypt Treaty New York Sun
[9]Wikitorowicz (2004) Islamic Activism; ASocial Movement Theory Approach Bloomington, Indiana University Press pp120-121. 72-75
[10]Hamid, S (2011) The Rise of the Islamists.Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No.3 pg. 40-47
[11] U.S.-EgyptianRelations (2011) International Debates Vol. 9 Issue 3 p14-23[12] Tibon,S, Blumberg, H.H. (1999) Authoritarianismand Political Socialization in the Context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,Political Psychology, Vol 20, No. 3
[13]Yaari E(2011) The Arab Revolutions: AnIsraeli Perspective. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
[14] U.S.-EgyptianRelations(2011) International Debates Vol. 9 Issue 3 p14-23
[15]CIA World fact book [16]Balaam, D.N., Vesseth. M (2008). Introduction to International Political Economy, Pearson, Jersey.
[17] Karan, P.P. (2004) The Non-WesternWorld. New York, Routledge.
[18]The Future of Egypt; PanelDiscussion (2006) The Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs Vol. 10, No.3 Article 3

[19]Goldstone, J.A. (2011) Understanding theRevolution of 2011 Foreign Affairs Vol. 90. No.3 pg.8-16
[20]Mirtha. F (2010). “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship; The Reality of“Cooperation.” Middle East Policy, Vol XXIINo.2
[21] Saif,I & Choucair, F (2010) Status QuoCamouflaged: Economic and Social Transformation. Middle East Law andGovernance pg,124-151
[22]Saad. R (2005) An Unlikely Homeland Al-Ahramissue # 758
[23] A Chillier Peace: Thirty years after thepeace treaty, Egypt and Israel are onlyfriends, (2009) The Economists
[24]R. Sarah (2011). Gazaafter the Revolution. Foreign Policy